{"full_name":"seL4/seL4","owner":"seL4","name":"seL4","shard":"1","url":"https://github.com/seL4/seL4","description":"The seL4 microkernel","homepage":"https://sel4.systems","topics":["sel4-microkernel","os","microkernel","sel4"],"tag_pages":["os"],"language":"C","license":"NOASSERTION","avatar":"https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/6878957?v=4","created_at":"2014-07-18T11:08:06Z","pushed_at":"2026-11-13T06:23:16Z","metrics":{"stars":5877,"forks":830,"watchers":204,"issues":545,"prs":1291,"releases":32,"issues_open":169,"issues_closed":376,"prs_open":59,"prs_closed":256,"prs_merged":976,"discussions":7},"growth":{"day":{"stars":2,"forks":1,"base_day":"2026-11-15"}},"history":{"dates":["2026-11-10","2026-11-11","2026-11-12","2026-11-13","2026-11-14","2026-11-15","2026-11-16"],"stars":[5872,5876,5875,5875,5873,5875,5877],"forks":[824,824,826,826,827,829,830],"watchers":[null,204,204,204,204,204,204],"issues_open":[null,169,169,169,169,169,169],"prs_open":[null,56,56,56,58,59,59]},"boards":{},"same_owner":[],"issues":[{"number":114,"title":"Receiving a notification does not set the message info","comments":37,"created_at":"2019-01-22T04:53:49Z"},{"number":844,"title":"Call updateTimestamp() before taking kernel lock for IRQs?","comments":33,"created_at":"2022-05-17T15:44:48Z"},{"number":1436,"title":"clang rv64/rv32 simulations started taking 12min+","comments":30,"created_at":"2025-03-26T09:16:37Z"},{"number":902,"title":"Append instead of enqueue tasks woken up by notifications","comments":29,"created_at":"2022-08-21T09:35:38Z"},{"number":1540,"title":"incorrect spurious interrupt reporting following commit 0f78e4e95776c56afac077a5d9971314353e4b19","comments":24,"created_at":"2025-10-31T01:36:30Z"},{"number":612,"title":"Misleading spurious IRQ report in MCS","comments":23,"created_at":"2021-10-05T09:33:19Z"},{"number":738,"title":"`SEL4_FORCE_LONG_ENUM` not C standard compatible","comments":20,"created_at":"2022-01-06T23:36:39Z"},{"number":1740,"title":"make MCS EP/NTFN queue operations O(1)","comments":17,"created_at":"2026-08-25T09:55:59Z"}],"discussions":[{"number":1691,"title":"about seL4_CallWithMRs","comments":4,"category":"Q&A","created_at":"2026-06-12T02:42:27Z"},{"number":1679,"title":"How to support multiple clusters","comments":1,"category":"Q&A","created_at":"2026-05-30T01:12:23Z"},{"number":1671,"title":"Regarding memory management issues","comments":1,"category":"Q&A","created_at":"2026-05-20T12:50:50Z"},{"number":1670,"title":"Do these pxn and uxn attributes need to be restricted","comments":1,"category":"Q&A","created_at":"2026-05-20T12:42:34Z"},{"number":1602,"title":"Why is there a 63 channel limit between protection domains?","comments":1,"category":"Q&A","created_at":"2026-03-03T21:43:26Z"},{"number":1449,"title":"Visual hierarchical breakdown of all features implemented in seL4 codebase","comments":0,"category":"Show and tell","created_at":"2025-04-21T18:11:02Z"},{"number":1201,"title":"Using GitHub discussions for technical dev announcements","comments":0,"category":"Announcements","created_at":"2024-02-20T22:04:20Z"}],"latest_release":{"name":"seL4 17.0.0","tag":"17.0.0","published_at":"2026-10-30T08:38:19Z","body":"# seL4 Version 17.0.0 Release\r\n\r\nAnnouncing the release of `seL4 17.0.0`. This release focussed on fixing issues in unverified configurations of seL4, as\r\nwell as auditing code in verified configurations that is not covered by the scope of seL4's formal proofs. Like previous releases, this release contains security relevant changes and we recommend upgrading to the latest version of seL4.\r\n\r\nWe would like to thank Anthropic for reporting a number of these issues and for the constructive, actionable and useful way they were communicated. Overall, this audit has strengthened the security of seL4 in all parts of the kernel that the formal proofs do not make guarantees about.\r\n\r\n## 17.0.0 2026-10-30: BREAKING\r\n\r\n### Security-relevant Changes\r\n\r\nAs in previous releases, some of these security relevant changes affect verified configurations. In all of these cases,\r\nthe issue is outside the scope of what the proofs guarantee. See the list of [verification assumptions] for what that\r\nscope includes. All issues we are currently aware of that affect verification assumptions have been fixed.\r\n\r\n[verification assumptions]: https://sel4.systems/Verification/assumptions.html\r\n\r\n* Fixed a kernel halt on Arm with hypervisor support that can be triggered by guest VMs, because EL1 debug registers\r\n  were not trapped or context switched. All EL1 debug register accesses now trap.\r\n  * Affected configurations: AArch64 and AArch32 with hypervisor support, including verified configurations.\r\n  * Affected versions: all previous versions\r\n  * Exploitability: any guest VM\r\n  * Severity: Critical. This crashes the system.\r\n\r\n* Fixed a kernel crash on x86 that can be triggered by any thread: the kernel kept running with user-controlled flags\r\n  after kernel entry. With `NT` set before a system call, the system triple-faulted on return to user level. `DF` was\r\n  not cleared on system call, interrupt and exception entry, although compiled kernel code assumes it is clear. The\r\n  kernel now clears all user-controllable flags on entry.\r\n  * Affected configurations: x86_64 and ia32, including verified configurations.\r\n  * Affected versions: all previous versions\r\n  * Exploitability: any thread, no capabilities required.\r\n  * Severity: Critical. This crashes the system.\r\n\r\n* Fixed VT-x on SMP and with multiple VMs per core: host GS/FS bases were not restored after VM exit, which crashed\r\n  SMP kernels and corrupted guest FPU state; all cores shared one VMXON region, causing unpredictable behaviour.\r\n  * Affected configurations: x86 with VT-x (unverified).\r\n  * Affected versions: 16.0.0 (GS/FS bases); all previous versions (VMXON region)\r\n  * Exploitability: triggered by normal VM operation.\r\n  * Severity: High. Kernel crash on SMP, guest state corruption.\r\n\r\n* Fixed missing trapping and context switching of system registers on AArch64 with hypervisor support, which formed\r\n  storage channels and interference paths between VMs, native threads and the kernel: PMU (Performance Measurement\r\n  Unit), `VDISR_EL2`, `CSSELR_EL1`, RAS error records, implementation-defined registers (`TIDCP`, and `ACTLR` with VCPU\r\n  access removed), LORegion and ID group 5 registers, SVE, SME, trace and activity monitor registers (`CPTR_EL2` is now\r\n  set at boot), GICv3 group 0 registers (`ICH_AP0R0_EL2` let a guest block interrupts for later VMs), and `TCR_EL1` for\r\n  native threads.\r\n  * Affected configurations: AArch64 with hypervisor support, including verified configurations. Some registers exist\r\n    only on cores with the corresponding feature (RAS, SVE, GICv3).\r\n  * Affected versions: all previous versions\r\n  * Exploitability: guest VM, no capabilities required.\r\n  * Severity: High, depending on threat model. Opens storage channels and guests can affect some system registers\r\n    visible to other VMs and native threads.\r\n\r\n* Fixed the same class of issues on AArch32 with hypervisor support: PMU, `CPACR` (a guest could disable the FPU for\r\n  native threads), `FPEXC`, upper halve","is_prerelease":false},"readme":true,"readme_zh":false,"news":[],"stale":false,"snapshot_at":"2026-11-16T09:23:14Z","history_start":"2026-09-06"}